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1.  Introduction 
Mandatory stress testing has been acclaimed by banking regulators as a key response to 
preventing future financial crises.  Each year the largest banks in the United States must perform 
these tests which in large part rely on statistical models to determine capital adequacy.
1
 Current 
stress testing practices rely heavily on statistical models to evaluate bank performance under 
adverse hypothetical economic scenarios.  The bank stress tests consist of two distinct exercises: 
The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) and the Dodd-Frank Act Stress 
Testing (DFAST).  Both rely on similar processes, data, supervisory exercises, and requirements 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2014 June 25).  CCAR is a yearly exercise 
conducted by the Federal Reserve to determine whether the largest functioning bank holding 
companies present in the United States have sufficient capital to continue operations throughout 
times of economic and financial market stress,  whether they have adequate, forward-looking 
risk management strategies, and whether the bank’s  planned dividend payments or common 
stock repurchases will leave it with adequate capitalization (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2015).  DFAST is a complementary exercise to CCAR operated by the Federal 
Reserve. This exercise “serves to inform the Federal Reserve, the financial companies, and the 
general public, how these institutions’ capital ratios might change during a hypothetical set of 
adverse economic conditions as designed by the Federal Reserve” (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2015). 
                                                          
1
 The original Federal Reserve CCAR stress test was applied to the 19 largest banks with assets exceeding $100 
billion.  The 2017 round of Federal Reserve run stress tests included 34 bank holding companies with assets of at 
least $50 billion.  In addition, the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (DFAST) requires that all federally regulated 
financial institutions with assets in excess of $10 billion conduct annual company-run stress tests.    
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These stress tests were first applied following the sharp deterioration in U.S. bank asset 
values in 2008.  U.S. housing prices fell 32% between July 2006 and March 2009.
2
   As shown in 
Figure 1, residential mortgage delinquency rates, that had averaged 1.9% before the recession, 
rose to an average of 8.2% between 2007-2013.  Delinquency rates were still twice their 
prerecession levels in 2016.  Commercial loan delinquency rates rose to almost 9% by 2010 but 
quickly fell and are now below their long-run averages.  Agriculture loans only modestly 
weakened in quality and actually helped to moderate overall loan delinquency rates for banks in 
rural areas. 
 As the quality of loans weakened, an increasing share of loans were written off.  Figure 2 
shows the time path of charge-offs.  The rate of charge-offs was atypically high for 6 years and 
only returned to prerecession levels in 2014.  The slow reduction of charge-off rates for home 
mortgages was exacerbated by a tendency for younger borrowers and less creditworthy 
borrowers to increase both their home equity debt and nonmortgage debt as home prices rose 
which made it difficult for those borrowers to meet their obligations when the housing prices fell 
(Brown, Stein and Zafar, 2015). 
 The FDIC closed an average of 58 banks per year since 2008 compared to fewer than 4 
bank closures per year between 2000 and 2007.
3
   As shown in Figure 3, the bank failures during 
this past recession were an order of magnitude larger than what was experienced in the 2001 
recession and the failures persisted well into the recovery.  The number of failures did not fall 
back to prerecession levels until 2016, reflecting the protracted period of atypically high 
delinquency and charge-offs.   
                                                          
2
 S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index 
3
 FDIC Failed Bank List is available from https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
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 The incidence of bank failure was even larger among the largest banks.  Gorton (2015) 
quotes Ben Bernanke as testifying that 12 of the 13 most important U.S. financial institutions 
were within 2 weeks of failing in 2008.  In the end, 13 of the 25 largest institutions failed, 
required government assistance to avoid failure, merged to avoid failure, or changed their 
business structure to avoid failure.
4
  
The surge in bank failures led to rising concerns that the failure of a few large banks 
could cause the failure of the entire financial system.  Macroeconomic factors explained about 
60% of the variation in net quarterly charge-off rates for a sample of 101 - 156 banks with assets 
of at least $10 billion (Kapinos and Mitnik, 2016).  But if stress tests are useful for large banks, 
would they also be useful for smaller banks?  Or is large bank loan performance atypically tied 
to macroeconomic shocks while small bank loan performance is tied to idiosyncratic shocks?  
This paper measures how much of the variation in mortgage charge-off rates can be 
attributed to international and national macroeconomic shocks if bank stress tests were applied to 
all banks in the United States rather than the few largest bank.  We also examine how the bank’s 
geographic market affects its exposure to regional shocks by assessing the importance of state-
level shocks relative to the aggregate shocks.  We conduct variance-decompositions on the 
annual mortgage charge-off rates on an average of 6,349 banks including the universe of all 
banks in operation over the period 2002-2014.  We find that as the bank increases in size, it’s 
loan quality becomes increasingly tied to macroeconomic shocks.  Less than 1% of the variation 
in mortgage charge-off rates can be explained by aggregate international or national shocks 
across all banks.  But for banks with assets of $10 billion or more, 85% of the variation in annual 
mortgage charge-offs can be explained by those aggregate shocks.  Hence, the current 
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 Gorton (2015), p. 979. 
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application of stress tests to the largest banks is appropriate as only those largest banks have 
asset quality that varies with those shocks. 
For the vast majority of banks, state-level shocks are more important for explaining 
mortgage charge-off rates than are national or international shocks.  Up to 6% of the variation in 
mortgage charge-offs is attributable to state shocks in the years after the Great Recession. 
However, the great majority of the variation in the quality of the loan portfolios of all but the 
very largest banks is attributable to idiosyncratic shocks, suggesting that only traditional bank 
examination can identify the weakness of the loan portfolios of the smaller banks. 
The finding that the asset quality of large banks is particularly correlated with 
macroeconomic shocks has several implications for systemic risk management.  First, it is 
difficult to diversify risk when the bank portfolio is already driven by its correlation with the 
national and international economies.  That exposes the largest banks to a source of risk not 
faced by smaller banks whose portfolios are typically uncorrelated with macroeconomic 
fluctuations.  Second, extreme aggregate shocks will be more common than microeconomic 
sectoral or regional shocks.  In fact, aggregate shocks may have fat tails, even when the sub-
aggregates are normally distributed (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi, 2017).  As a result, 
large banks may be atypically exposed to extreme shocks.   
If banks are not adequately capitalized to absorb these shocks, then large banks will be at 
greater than normal risk of failure.  This is in line with current policy which requires the largest 
banks to hold more equity capital.
5
 Uniform equity capital requirements across all banks would 
                                                          
5
 The Supplementary Leverage Ratio applies to any U.S. top-tier bank holding company (BHC) with at least $700 
billion in total consolidated assets or at least $10 trillion in assets under custody (covered BHC) and any insured 
depository institution subsidiary of these BHCs. https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2013/nr-
ia-2013-109a.pdf 
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then prove inadequate for these largest banks, consistent with the atypically high failure rate 
experienced for the largest banks in the Great Recession.  On the other hand, the smallest banks 
in the sample with deposits concentrated in a single state also had atypically high risk of 
nonperforming loans.  These results suggest that equity capital requirements should continue to 
reflect the differential risk of default related to bank size. 
2.  Literature Review 
Stress tests were implemented to address the needs of several different groups.  Foremost 
was the need for regulators and policy-makers to assess the fragility of the banking system and 
the possible need for intervention.  The recession showed that bank capital reserves were 
inadequate to cover losses. Swagel (2015) stated that Treasury officials had been urging financial 
firms to have greater capital reserves but they lacked the regulatory authority to mandate higher 
reserve ratios.  In his recounting of the crisis, Timothy Geithner (2014) expressed regret that the 
Federal Reserve Bank should have required greater reserve ratios.  Egan, Hortaçsu and Matvos 
(2017) simulation model suggests that capital requirements below 18% can lead to excessive 
bankruptcies in adverse economic conditions.   
But traditional bank examination does not assess the adequacy of reserves in the event of 
a large adverse economic shock.  Stress tests were different from bank examinations in that they 
were applied simultaneously to many banks to project future capital needs rather than current 
capital needs (Morgan, Peristiani and Savino, 2014).  As a result, effective stress tests allow 
regulators to assess proactively rather than retroactively what policies to implement to prevent 
failure from occurring or whether a firm must be seized to maintain operations.  They may also 
be used to recommend legislative action to prepare for possible bailouts, as the FDIC must now 
seek Congressional approval before making broad debt guarantees (Swagel, 2015). 
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 A second group that benefits from the stress tests are investors.  While publicly available 
data on banks is retrospective, the stress test process reveals important information to the public 
regarding a bank’s ability to weather future shocks.  Banks that were shown to have insufficient 
capital in the first stress tests experienced the largest decline in returns.  Moreover, stock prices 
for the largest 50 banks not subject to the stress tests also responded to the public release of 
information, presumably because of presumed correlation in the observed capital gaps for the 
largest banks and unobserved capital adequacy for the next largest banks (Morgan, Peristiani and 
Savino, 2014).    
The spillover benefits from the stress tests to the economy at large included the improved 
confidence in the U.S. financial system.  As reviewed by Gorton (2015), to be successful in 
restoring confidence, stress tests need to be transparent, they must be released at a point when 
market uncertainty about the banking system is high, and they must be accompanied by 
government assurances of support for the most vulnerable banks.  During the crisis, stress tests 
helped alleviate uncertainty regarding the amount of the capital gap individually and in 
aggregate, whether the government would nationalize or provide a capital infusion, and whether 
the government had the capability of stabilizing the sector. 
But if these benefits follow from stress tests, why should the stress test be reserved for 
just the largest banks?  The most obvious reason is that the failure of a very large bank would 
generate losses for many other financial institutions, creating a possibility of cascading failures at 
these other financial institutions.  Related is the possible need for government or central bank 
intervention into large banks.  In fact, the 8 largest institutions that received government bailouts 
in the crisis received $125 billion as a group, half the total capital injected into the banking 
system as a whole (Swagel, 2015).  Focusing stress testing on the largest banks increases the 
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likelihood of discovering weaknesses early enough to act in the banks generating the greatest 
systemic risk. 
But are large banks also more likely to fail and hence in the greatest need for stress tests?  
If 13 of the largest 25 financial institutions failed in the Great Recession, is it because large 
financial institutions took on more risk or are they more vulnerable to cyclical shocks?  If the 
latter, an additional reason to apply the stress tests on the large banks is that they are atypically 
vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks.  Smaller banks would then be more subject to the 
idiosyncratic shocks more commonly identified by traditional bank examination. 
There are several reasons why large banks are more exposed to general versus 
idiosyncratic shocks.  Because of their size, large banks are exposed to all sectors and to both 
foreign and domestic economic fluctuations.  A bank whose assets span the economy is more 
diversified in one sense in that individual sectoral or geographical shocks will be less likely to 
affect bank financial performance, but the bank’s asset quality will be more sensitive to 
aggregate macroeconomic fluctuations.   
The greater correlation between easily observed macroeconomic shocks and large bank 
returns means that large banks have the disadvantage of visibility.  Large banks also face a 
disadvantage if they have to sell assets in response to short-term financial weakness because they 
may be large enough to bid down the value of the assets, a problem smaller banks would not 
face.  Borrowing from the Federal Reserve’s discount window is easily observed.  Large banks 
were so averse to revealing that signal to their investors that they paid 44 basis points more than 
the discount window rate for short-term credit (Armantier et al, 2015).  The asset quality of the 
largest banks was sufficiently observable that investors anticipated the results of the stress tests 
before the results were released  (Morgan, Peristiani and Savino, 2014).  The sensitivity of large 
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banks to macroeconomic fluctuations could make them too big not to fail.  Perhaps that 
vulnerability is why their risk management strategies did not sufficiently anticipate the cost of 
extreme events to their portfolios and left them undercapitalized as a result.
6
 
3.  Methodology and Data 
 Our hypothesis is that the loan portfolios of large banks are more susceptible to aggregate 
shocks than are smaller banks.  To test this, we need to develop measures of aggregate shocks 
that are common across all banks.  To be complete, we allow aggregate shocks to originate at the 
international, national, or state levels.  We use mortgage charge-off rates as our indicator of bank 
loan performance.  Mortgages have two important advantages.  Virtually all banks are exposed to 
the mortgage market, and so we do not have selection on which banks are included in the 
analysis.  And mortgages are subject to local market conditions, and so loan performance is 
affected by both global and local economic fluctuations.  Finally, charge-off models are a 
common loss forecasting method used by banks, especially smaller banks like those that 
dominate our sample (McPhail and McPhail, 2015).   
 Charge-offs can be measured by net or gross measures.  Gross charge-offs aggregate all 
losses, but not all charge-offs are permanently lost.  Some fraction of loans are subsequently 
paid.  Net charge-offs off-set gross charge-offs by any recoveries:  collections made on loans 
previously viewed as write-offs.  The two measures are: 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡−12
  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 − 𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
12 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒−𝑜𝑓𝑓 −𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑛𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑑 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡−12
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 Large banks would also be vulnerable to fat tailed risks that occur in the aggregate, even if individual sectors face 
normally distributed shocks (Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and Tahbaz-Salehi (2017). 
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Typically, charge-off rates are positive, meaning that charge-offs are greater than recoveries. A 
negative value for net charge-offs indicates that recoveries are greater than charge-offs. This can 
occur, for example, when exiting a crisis period during which time a portfolio may realize large 
recoveries from prior defaults while in the same quarter experiencing fewer charge-offs on new 
defaults. In our sample of banks, 9.7% of the net charge-offs were negative, but the fraction of 
negative net rates was as low as 6.4% in 2008 and as high as 16.6% in 2014. 
 We explain bank charge-off rates for mortgages using the following model: 
(1) 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼𝑡𝑘 +  𝛼𝑗𝑘 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘; 𝑘 = 𝐺, 𝑁 
where 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐺  is the gross mortgage charge-off rate for bank i in state j in year t and 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁  is the 
corresponding net charge-off rate.  𝛼𝑖𝑘  is a bank specific fixed effect; 𝛼𝑡𝑘 is a time specific fixed 
effect that is common across all banks in year t  which would include national and international 
economic shocks, federal regulations, interest rates and other common economic factors 
influencing bank profitability; 𝛼𝑗𝑘 are state-specific fixed factors and 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝑘 are state-specific 
cyclical factors common to all banks in the state, and 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡 are the remaining time-varying effects 
influencing bank write-offs in year t. 𝛼𝑖𝑘 can be further decomposed into known bank specific 
effects, such as bank size and bank concentration, and unknown bank specific effects.
7
 
4.  Results for Large Banks versus Small Banks 
 Our first objective is to measure the share of the variance in bank loan performance, 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐺  
and 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁 , that can be explained by international, national or state specific shocks.  The national 
and international factors change every year but are common across all the banks in our data.  
                                                          
7
 Rodriguez and Trucharte (2007) propose a model of stress testing that predicts individual borrower default rates, 
but this data is not publically available. 
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Consequently, we can capture the ability of these variables to explain variation in bank asset 
performance as a year-specific fixed effect that captures the effect of common aggregate shocks 
across our sample of banks. 
 Banks are also subject to state-specific shocks.  Some banks have all their assets in a 
single state while others have assets spread broadly across states.  We define the bank i’s 
exposure to state j by 𝑠𝑖𝑗 =
𝐴𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝐴𝑖𝑗
50
𝑗=1
, where 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the bank i’s deposits in state j.  The 𝑠𝑖𝑗 𝜖 [0,1] 
with ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
50
𝑗=1 = 1.  We can then decompose variation in mortgage charge-offs using the 
regression 
(2)  𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑘
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝐷𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝐷𝑗
50
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘; 𝑘 = 𝐺, 𝑁 
In this specification, 𝛼𝑡𝑘 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑘
𝑇
𝑡=1 𝐷𝑡,  𝛼𝑗𝑘 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝐷𝑗
50
𝑗=1 , and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘 = 𝛼𝑖𝑘 + 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝑘 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘.  We 
can then measure how much of the variation in 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑘  is due to common year effect and how much 
is due to state effects.  The rest of the variation is due to state-specific temporal effects or 
idiosyncratic effects specific to the bank.   
To show how bank size effects the extent of the bank’s exposure to common shocks, we 
divide the banks into three groups, all banks, all banks with at least $1 billion in assets and all 
banks with at least $10 billion in assets.  With those groups, we have sufficient number of banks 
in all years to conduct an adequate assessment of how macroeconomic shocks vary in importance 
to bank asset quality by bank size. 
We decided to pick years 3 years apart to avoid clouding our results with serial 
collinearity in bank charge-off rates.  Therefore, our data includes the years 2002, 2005, 2008, 
2011, and 2014.  Although we do not use every year, the included years match the pattern of 
11 
 
delinquency rates, charge-off rates and bank failures shown in Figures 1-3.  There is a dramatic 
rise in mortgage charge-off rates in 2008 relative to previous years, rising to an average of just 
under $1 charge-off in every $1000 in mortgage balances.   Some banks had amazingly large 
charge-off rates with the worst exceeding 50%.  The changing distributions are shown in Figure 
4.  The vast majority of banks had very low charge-off rates. 
We report the results in Table 1.  It is clear that across the average of 6,349 banks, most 
of the variation in bank charge-off rates is unrelated to macroeconomic or state shocks.  Only 
1.3% of the variation is due to common shocks across banks and the rest is due to temporary 
shocks to the economies of the states in which the bank has assets or to factors unique to the 
bank itself.  As we limit the sample to only very large banks, macroeconomic shocks and state 
shocks become the dominant source of variation in bank charge-offs.  For the 1.6% of banks with 
at least $1 billion in assets, 57% of the charge-off rates are attributable to macroeconomic 
shocks.  An additional 4.3% of the variation is attributable to state fixed effects, leaving 38-39% 
of the variation that is idiosyncratic to the bank or the state. 
For the 0.8% of banks with at least $10 billion in assets, the macroeconomic shocks 
become even more important, explaining 85% of the variation in mortgage charge-off rates.  
State fixed effects add 2-2.5% of the variation, leaving around 12.5% of the variation attributable 
to idiosyncratic factors.  Clearly, as banks get larger, the quality of their portfolio becomes more 
strongly tied to national and state economic shocks, and their charge-off rates are less tied to 
unobservable bank factors.  That means that the asset quality of the largest banks is easier for 
investors to assess from public information.  It also means that the banks that have been subject 
to stress tests are the banks whose financial performance is most closely tied to the shocks that 
make up the stress tests. 
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5.  Results Regarding the Application of Stress Tests to All Banks  
 The previous section demonstrates that macroeconomic shocks are more important for 
large banks than small banks, but it is useful to assess how well a stress test would function if 
applied universally rather than selectively.  The Federal Reserve’s supervisory scenarios in the 
CCAR use 28 variables which describe domestic and international economic circumstances.  Six 
measures of U.S. economic activity and prices are incorporated including measures of inflation, 
unemployment, per capita income and aggregate output.  Four measures of asset prices are used 
including housing, commercial property and stock prices and stock price volatility.  Six different 
interest rates varying by maturity and government or private issuance are added.  The remaining 
measures control for changes in foreign country GDP, price levels, and exchange rates. We use a 
subset of these measures to build a vector of national shocks used to proxy 𝛼𝑡𝑘. 
 We build in state-specific economic shocks, 𝛼𝑗𝑘 and 𝛼𝑗𝑡𝑘  by using the national cyclical 
measures as a guide.  Interest rates and inflation are assumed common across states but other 
cyclical variables vary across states.  Our local market equivalent of the U.S. GDP growth rate is 
the year-over-year rate of change in gross state product lagged one year.  The strength of the 
state housing market is measured by the year-over-year growth in housing prices lagged one 
year.  The strength of the state labor market is measured by the state unemployment rate for the 
previous year.  Results are similar if we alter the lag or we use growth measured over multiple 
years rather than one year.   
   Measures of state economic performance measures were downloaded from the Federal 
Reserve’s Economic Database (FRED) housed at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.  The 
vector of state factors includes weighted averages of indicators of the strength of the state 
economy where the weights are share of bank assets in each state.  For example, state 
13 
 
unemployment rates are used as an indicator of the state-specific business cycle with higher 
unemployment rates signaling weak economic conditions.  The relevant bank measure of the 
unemployment rate is the state share weighted sum of state unemployment rates: 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑈𝑗𝑡
50
𝑗=1  . 
Our vector of known bank-specific factors includes two measures of bank portfolio 
strategies.  The first is the value of total bank assets, taken as a measure of bank size.  While one 
would have expected larger banks would have better risk management strategies, we have 
already seen that larger banks are more exposed to aggregate shocks.  The second is bank 
concentration by state. Banks may be entirely concentrated in one state or may have exposure to 
many states.  The latter banks are better diversified.  We can create the following Herfindahl – 
Hirschman Index to explain bank state concentration:∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑗
250
𝑗=1 .  The index can range from 0.02 (a 
bank with exactly 2% of its deposits in every state) to 1 (a bank with 100% of its deposits in a 
single state). When regressed with our independent variables, we can see how much of the 
bank’s performance is exposed at the state and national level. In addition, we can also find how 
much of the variance is due to idiosyncratic bank policies.  
 Table 2 reports the sample means by year included in our analysis.  The time variation in 
the data reveals some interesting trends.  Banks face fluctuations in state or regional markets and 
many have all their assets in a single state.  The Herfindahl Index measuring bank concentration 
in a single state averaged 0.99 in 2002 and was still 0.95 by 2014 after considerable 
consolidation during and after the recession.  Hence, the smallest banks are exposed to state-level 
shocks as opposed to national or international shocks.  But even the largest banks have relatively 
concentrated deposits.  Banks with over $10 billion in assets have an average Herfindahl index of 
0.2 which is the equivalent of sharing deposits evenly across 5 states.  More commonly, the 
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largest banks report a disproportionate share of their deposits from one or two states then small 
shares scattered across a larger number of states.  
As the data show, there is wide variation in economic climate, both across years and 
across states within individual years.  The state-by-state variation in a single year is sometimes 
greater than the national variation across all years.  For example, in 2011, state unemployment 
rates varied from 3.8% from 13.5% while the national unemployment rate varied from 5.4% to 
9.8% over the 5 years. Variation in the growth rates of housing prices and real gross state 
product are also substantial at any given point in time.  Variation from bottom to top of housing 
price changes is on the order of 20 percentage points and variation in GSP growth rates typically 
varies by 10 percentage points.    In 2008, the percentage change in state housing prices varied 
between -19% to +3.4% and GSP growth varied from -5.5% to +8.8%.  
Table 1 reported the share of variation in mortgage charge-offs that could be explained by 
international and national time varying factors plus state fixed effects.  Only 1.3% of the 
variation across banks can be attributed to those shocks.  If we add in the time varying state 
effects, we only explain an additional 0.7% of the charge-off rates across banks. For a total 
explained variance of 2.1% due to macroeconomic shocks sourced at the internal, national or 
state levels.  Most bank asset quality is due to bank policies that are uncorrelated with these 
common shocks; the idiosyncratic factors that are the subject of traditional bank examination. 
It is possible that aggregate shocks do not matter when times are good but they matter a 
great deal in cyclical downturns.
8
  Table 3 displays the share of charge-off variation attributable 
to state-level economic shocks by year.  Before 2008, a period in which banks failed at a rate of 
4 per year, state-specific shocks had little impact on mortgage default rates.  Only 1-2% of 
                                                          
8
 This is Warren Buffet’s observation that you do not know who is swimming naked until the tide goes out. 
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mortgage charge-off rates were due to state economic shocks.  After 2008 as bank failures 
became more common, state shocks also became more important.  But even then, state shocks 
were responsible for about 6% of the mortgage charge-off rates in 2011 and 2-3% of mortgage 
charge-off rates in 2014.  Across most banks, asset quality is not driven by exogenous factors. 
In Tables 4A-B, we add some additional details on the nature of the state and national 
economic shocks.  The results are similar across the two tables and so we focus our discussion on 
the net charge-off rates in Table 4B.  Column 1 shows the relative importance of state and 
national economic factors.  State economic measures perform much as one would expect.  Banks 
in states with high unemployment rates and declining housing prices face rising mortgage 
charge-off rates.   Years with high corporate interest rates and more variable stock prices also 
lead to more mortgage write offs.   
However, the more interesting regressions are in the last column where we add bank 
attributes.  Banks with assets concentrated in 1 or relative few states have higher charge-off 
rates, presumably because they are less able to diversify risks associated with state economic 
shocks.  However, as banks increase in size measured by assets, they experience higher charge-
off rates, perhaps because they are more heavily exposed to undiversifiable macroeconomic 
shocks.  Further analysis is needed to understand whether the realized returns to larger banks 
justify their exposure to more risky mortgage portfolios.  
Our results rely on a top-down modeling approach that is not able to capture the details of 
bank loan portfolios such as borrower credit scores, loan-to-value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, 
loan product type, and other borrower characteristics that could be used to predict bank default 
rates as in Rodriguez and Trucharte (2007). Those factors may interact with the macroeconomic 
factors in ways that would make the latter more informative in projecting charge-off rates for 
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smaller banks.  If so, our results underestimate the extent to which macroeconomic factors 
explain charge-off rates. However, it is doubtful that the explanatory power of the 
macroeconomic shocks will rise to a level that would justify the use of stress tests rather than 
traditional bank examination for the vast majority of the smaller banks.   
6.  Conclusion 
Idiosyncratic bank policies are responsible for 98% of the variation in bank mortgage 
charge-off rates on average.  Even in recessions, state and national economic shocks explain at 
most 6% of the variation in the quality of mortgage portfolios.  For the 98% of banks with assets 
below $1 billion, macroeconomic shocks of the sort employed in stress tests are not relevant for 
assessing the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio.  While macroeconomic fluctuations rise in 
importance during recessions, it is still the standard bank examination that would be necessary to 
evaluate the bank’s idiosyncratic risk of default.  
For the largest banks, however, macroeconomic shocks explain the great majority of the 
charge-off rates and do provide relevant predictive information on asset quality.  These banks 
represent the majority of all bank assets in the United States and so they are relevant for 
monetary authorities seeking to limit systemic risk.  These banks appear to have greater risk than 
smaller banks due to their exposure to national or international shocks whose impact cannot be 
limited by diversification.  Moreover, because of the correlation between their asset quality and 
observable macroeconomic shocks, investor flight is also a bigger potential problem for the 
largest banks in economic downturns.  New rules implemented since the Great Recession require 
that regulators shift losses onto bondholders, shareholders and other lenders, meaning that 
investor flight may be even more dramatic in the future. Consequently, their size, importance and 
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sensitivity to large adverse shocks suggest that regulators continue to require the largest banks to 
hold relatively more equity capital.  
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Table 1:  Analysis of variance in bank net mortgage charge-off rates attributable to 
macroeconomic, state, and idiosyncratic shocks, 2002-2014, by bank size 
 All Banks 
 
Banks with over 
$1 billion in assets 
Banks with over 
$10 billion in assets 
 
Net Gross Net Gross Net Gross 
Total 
100.0% 100.0% 100% 100.0% 100% 100.0% 
Year Effects  𝛼𝑡𝑘 0.7% 0.7% 57.3% 57.1% 85.1% 85.5% 
State Effects  𝛼𝑗𝑘 0.6% 0.6% 4.3% 4.3% 2.5% 2.0% 
Idiosyncratic Bank and 
State-by-Year Effects  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑘 98.7% 98.7% 38.4% 38.6% 12.4% 12.5% 
Average Number of banks 
6,349 108 57 
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Table 2: Means and Ranges for variables using the sample of all banks.  Exogenous 
variables are lagged one year 
 
List of variables 
 
2002 2005 2008 2011 2014 
Bank-level data  
Net Charge-off rates for 
mortgages (x1000) 
(Range) 
.110 
(-54.2, 37.6) 
.140 
(-48.0, 71.9) 
.976 
(-82.9, 505) 
1.40 
(-27.0, 192) 
.329 
(-150, 157) 
Gross charge-off rates 
for mortgages(x1000) 
(Range) 
.208 
(-18.5, 29.6) 
.223 
(-1.75, 72.0) 
1.05 
(-23.3, 505) 
1.53 
(-27.1, 192) 
.515 
(-20.9, 157) 
Herfindahl index with 1 
indicating all assets in 
one state 
(Range) 
.99 
(.10, 1) 
.97 
(.094, 1) 
.97 
(.092, 1) 
.96 
(.11, 1) 
.95 
(.094, 1) 
The logarithm of bank 
assets 
(Range) 
12.3 
(4.22, 23.3) 
12.4 
(4.22, 24.3) 
12.4 
(4.22, 23.7) 
12.4 
(6.64, 23.1) 
12.7 
(8.19, 24.9) 
State-level data  
State Unemployment 
Rate* 
(Range) 
4.18 
(2.8, 6.3) 
5.40 
(3.4, 7.6) 
4.39 
(2.4, 6.9) 
8.88 
(3.8, 13.5) 
6.78 
(3.0, 9.8) 
State Home Price 
Growth Rate* 
(Range) 
.052 
(.0076, .15) 
.091 
(.039, .29) 
-.022 
(-.19, .034) 
-.033 
(-.14, .043) 
.050 
(.0070, .18) 
Gross State Product 
Growth Rate*  
(Range) 
.019 
(-.021, .13) 
.029 
(-.0016, .084) 
-.003 
(-.055, .088) 
.020 
(-.028, .092) 
.022 
(-.025, .097) 
National-level data  
Chicago Boards Options 
Exchange Growth Rate* 
18.4 13.2 32.2 24.3 15.6 
BofA Merrill Lynch US 
Corporate BBB Effective 
Yield* 
7.8 
 
5.01 5.95 5.54 3.36 
10-year Treasury 
Maturity Rate* 
5.16 
 
4.15 4.76 3.73 1.91 
3-month Treasury Bill 
Rate* 
5.15 
 
4.15 4.98 0.06 2.33 
National Unemployment 
Rate* 
6.3 5.7 5.4 9.8 7.0 
Number of Banks 
(included in analysis) 
6,292 6,774 6,940 6,185 5,555 
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Table 3:  Share of annual variation in mortgage charge-off rates that is attributable to state-specific 
effects 
Year Net rate Gross rate 
2002 1.0% 1.8% 
2005 0.6% 0.7% 
2008 1.2% 1.2% 
2011 5.7% 6.1% 
2014 3.2% 2.2% 
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Table 4A:  Regression Models Explaining Bank Gross Charge-off Rates 
(t-statistics are in parentheses and significance is marked by * or **) 
 Variables Macro Year dummies Macro & 
State 
dummies 
Year & State 
dummies 
National Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.1032**    
  (2.42)    
 CBOE Options 
Index 
0.033**    
  (4.33)    
  Yield of BBB 
Corporate 
Bonds 
0.0485    
  (1.47)    
 T Bill Rate -0.0419*    
  (1.76)    
State Unemployment 
Rate 
0.2158** 0.216**   
  (7.32) (7.32)   
 GSP Growth 
Rate  
-0.4275 -0.4275   
  (0.19) (0.19)   
 Housing Price 
Growth Rate 
-4.5867** -4.5867**   
  (5.25) (5.25)   
Year 2005  -6.63 -3.03 -1.67 
   (0.55) (0.28) (0.16) 
 2008  46.58** 78.96** 81.47** 
   (3.76) (7.42) (7.66) 
 2011  -6.26 127.07** 130.82** 
   (0.33) (11.6) (11.94) 
 2014  -26.2* 22.96** 25.83** 
   (1.91) (2.03) (2.29) 
Bank Herfindahl 
Index 
   3.7374** 
     (7.23) 
 ln (Bank 
Assets) 
   0.1371** 
     (5.05) 
Constant  -0.571* -0.4506** 1.6218** -2.6126** 
  (1.76) (2.74) (8.93) (3.95) 
State effects    √ √ 
Year Effects   √ √ √ 
 R
2 
0.0104 0.0104 0.0133 0.0151 
 N 31746 31746 31746 31746 
24 
 
Table 4B: Regression Models Explaining Bank Net Charge-off Rates  
(t-statistics are in parentheses and significance is marked by * or **) 
 Variables Macro Year dummies Macro & State 
dummies 
Year & State 
dummies 
National Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.1169**    
  (2.66)    
 CBOE Options 
Index 
0.0344**    
  (4.38)    
  Yield of BBB 
Corporate 
Bonds 
0.0695**    
  (2.03)    
 T Bill Rate -0.0663**    
  (2.04)    
State Unemployment 
Rate 
0.197** 0.197**   
  (6.48) (6.48)   
 GSP Growth 
Rate 
-0.9586 -0.9586   
  (0.41) (0.41)   
 Housing Price 
Growth Rate 
-4.7271** -4.7271**   
  (5.25) (5.25)   
Year 2005  -0.0198 -0.0162 -0.00146 
   (0.16) (0.15) (0.01) 
 2008  0.4632** 0.807** 0.8344** 
   (3.62) (7.35) (7.61) 
 2011  -0.0257 1.2315** 1.2726** 
   (0.13) (10.90) (11.26) 
 2014  -0.2999** 0.1405* 0.1712 
   (2.12) (1.21) (1.47) 
Bank Herfindahl 
Index 
   4.0192** 
     (7.54) 
 ln(Bank Assets)    0.1544** 
     (5.52) 
Constant  -0.5513* -0.4535** 1.5338** -3.1525** 
  (1.65) (2.67) (8.19) (4.62) 
State effects    √ √ 
 R
2 
0.0094 0.0094 0.012 0.0141 
 N 31746 31746 31746 31746 
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Figure 1: Bank Quarterly Delinquency Rates, 2000 – 2016 
 
Figure 2 Bank Quarterly Charge-off Rates, 2000 – 2016
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Figure 3:  Annual Bank closures in the United States, 2000 – 2016 
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Figure 4: Cumulative Distribution of Bank Net Mortgage Charge-Off Rates, various years 
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